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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

1 OF 1

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# **TRENDS**

**In Communist Propaganda**

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
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12 DECEMBER 1973  
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## ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

## MOSCOW CAUTIOUS, NONCOMMITAL ON PEACE CONFERENCE ISSUES

While Moscow has begun to give increased attention to the peace talks scheduled to open in Geneva on 18 December, comment has skirted the issues and maintained an attitude of caution regarding the outcome. Soviet media have portrayed Egypt as prepared to work in constructive and businesslike fashion to facilitate positive results at the conference and contrasted this stance with Israel's "obstructive" attitude and its intransigence on the issue of withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967. Moscow has avoided discussion of the format of the conference and has not indicated any differences with Egypt over the question of UN versus superpower supervision of the talks.

## KISSINGER NEWS CONFERENCE

In brief accounts of Secretary Kissinger's 6 December news conference, Soviet media cited him as saying the Soviet Union was playing a constructive role in preparations regarding the possible agenda, composition, and scope of the conference, and as declaring that a Middle East settlement could not be reached without Soviet participation. The Moscow account said that Kissinger, responding to a question about the possibility of joint Soviet-U.S. participation in guaranteeing peace, said the United States was willing to consider the question of guarantees "in the broadest sense, to study the opinions of the other side on this question, and to discuss the possibility of individual and joint guarantees." The Secretary in fact said that the United States was prepared to consider the question of guarantees in its broadest sense and "we're willing to examine any idea that any of the parties might put forward as to what would constitute adequate guarantees."

Moscow ignored his qualification that the United States was prepared to consider—"not necessarily agree to"—either individual or joint guarantees, and it did not acknowledge his remark that "we are somewhat dubious" about the permanent stationing of U.S. or Soviet forces in the Middle East and that "we do not rule it out totally, but we are reluctant to get into this."

## ARAB, ISRAELI STANCE ON TALKS

Soviet media have drawn a contrast between the "constructive" attitude that Egypt is taking toward the peace talks and the alleged Israeli efforts to frustrate the conference. Thus an Aleksandrov

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commentary on Moscow's domestic service on the 10th pointed to Egyptian compliance with the Security Council's cease-fire resolutions as well as the 11 November Egyptian-Israeli agreement, and compared this with Israel's refusal to fulfill its obligations by withdrawing to the 22 October positions. Moscow has not as yet taken note of recent statements by Israeli ministers raising the issue of Syrian-held prisoners of war as a barrier to talks with Syria at the peace conference. Brief reports on Israeli Defense Minister Dayan's 8-9 December talks in Washington cited him as saying he sought further arms supplies and had been received "sympathetically," but placed no particular stress on the arms issue and did not directly suggest that it had any implications for the peace talks. A Moscow domestic service broadcast on the 11th did observe that this sort of aid "is far from encouraging the Israeli leaders to undertake joint steps" toward a peaceful settlement, and went on to cite Dayan as declaring that Israel would not withdraw to the 1967 frontiers and would continue to maintain this position at the Geneva conference.

Soviet media have publicized Egyptian statements in connection with the peace talks but have not conceded that there is any difference of opinion between Egypt and the sponsoring powers over UN rather than U.S.-Soviet supervision of the conference. Thus TASS and Moscow's Arabic-language service reported without comment a 9 December AL-AHRAM article outlining Egypt's conditions for participation in a peace conference: invitations should be extended by the Security Council; the UN secretary general should appoint a representative to the conference; and all parties concerned--Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Israel, as well as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)--should participate, with Lebanon to be contacted to insure its presence. According to an IRAQI NEWS AGENCY account on the 10th, AL-AHRAM spelled out two differing views regarding invitations to the conference and responsibility for supervising its functions: in the American-Soviet view, the United States and the USSR should extend invitations and run the conference sessions with the UN secretary general representing the United Nations as an observer; in the view of "the nonaligned states, supported by Egypt," the invitation should be extended by the Security Council, not the superpowers alone, and the whole conference should be under UN auspices and supervision. AL-AHRAM reiterated this view in a 12 December article, reported by MENA, calling for "genuine" UN supervision of the conference.

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Soviet pickups of statements by Egyptian official spokesmen have included a TASS report on the 7th citing Foreign Minister Fahmi as saying in a Norwegian television interview that Egypt is prepared to attend the conference and demands full Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967. Fahmi was quoted as saying that the establishment of an equitable peace with neighboring countries would be the best guarantee for Israel. A foreign-language commentary by Rassadin on the 10th cited Deputy Prime Minister Hatim as saying that Egypt, while prepared to attend a conference, would not allow it to be transformed into a platform for Israeli maneuvers and a return to the pre-war impasse.

Soviet media have only briefly alluded to the problem of Jordanian-Palestinian participation. Moscow domestic service on the 7th noted that the Jordanian prime minister had announced that Jordan proposed to begin a dialog with Egypt, Syria and the PLO to work out a common position on the eve of the peace conference. TASS on 9 December reported that according to the Palestinian news agency the Palestinian resistance movement had rejected a Jordanian "reconciliation plan" which envisaged the establishment of a government in Jordan which would include Palestinians and which would appoint a Jordanian delegation to the Geneva conference. TASS did not report Jordan's denial of this alleged approach to the Palestinians, broadcast by Amman radio on the 9th.

#### USSR LINKS AID TO ARABS WITH ITS SECURITY COUNCIL OBLIGATIONS

A standard reference to Soviet "assistance and support" to the Arabs appeared in an unusual context in the 4 December issue of the Moscow newspaper SOCIALIST INDUSTRY. After declaring that the USSR "has rendered and is rendering broad assistance and support" to the Arab states, the author went on to say:

However, as many international observers are stressing, in granting this assistance the USSR has never forgotten the great responsibility which it bears as a permanent member of the Security Council to maintain international peace, and has always expressed readiness to cooperate with all interested countries in the matter of normalizing the situation in this region.

By juxtaposing the phrase on assistance and support to a reminder of Soviet obligations as a Security Council member, it might appear that the article was suggesting Moscow would be prepared to review

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its military aid policies in the context of movement toward a Middle East peace settlement. But SOCIALIST INDUSTRY is an unlikely vehicle for any such signal, and the author, G. Dadyants, has not been known as a specialist in Middle East affairs, although a few years ago he wrote some articles on the area as a SOVIET RUSSIA correspondent. Soviet media have not addressed the issue of an arms limitation in the Middle East since the October conflict, but Moscow's position on this matter is not known to have changed from that spelled out by Kosygin in a June 1967 press conference at the United Nations. Limitation of arms shipments to the Middle East, Moscow has argued, cannot be discussed before Israel has withdrawn from the occupied territories.

In referring to Moscow's "broad assistance and support" to the Arabs, Dadyants was echoing Kirilenko's 6 November speech on the October Revolution anniversary. But Kirilenko's remark was placed in the more common context of Soviet principles of "solidarity with the struggle against aggression and for people's independence and rights." Dadyants' phrase on "readiness to cooperate" was drawn from Brezhnev's 26 October speech to the Moscow World Peace Congress in which he had declared that the Soviet Union, in the cause of normalizing the situation in the Middle East, was prepared to cooperate with all countries concerned. But Brezhnev in that speech made no pledge of Soviet "assistance" to the Arabs, going no further than to affirm Moscow's "firm and consistent support" for the Arab peoples' "just demands."

Dadyants also quoted, without attribution, from the Brezhnev speech when he described the USSR's "clear and consistent" policy on a Middle East settlement as proceeding from the general principles of socialist foreign policy and "from the fact that the Near East region is in direct proximity to the Soviet borders."

ARAB RECOGNITION  
OF ISRAEL

Dadyants is the second Soviet commentator recently to touch on the issue of Arab recognition of Israel, a question seldom specifically addressed in Soviet media since the 1967 war. An article by Georgiy Mirskiy in NEW TIMES (No. 48, 30 November), in reviewing the provisions of Resolution 242, remarked that by withdrawing from the captured lands Israel would obtain lasting peace based on its recognition by its Arab neighbors and on international guarantees. Mirskiy in a broadcast commentary in February 1969 had also linked recognition with Israeli withdrawal. Dadyants argued that Arab recognition of Israel was implicit in Arab acceptance of Resolution 242: "It is sometimes said that the

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Arab countries should in some special form recognize the state of Israel's 'right to exist.' However, it is clear that by recognizing Resolution 242 the Arab states thereby also recognize Israel." "Under these conditions," Dadyants concluded, "the main problem of 'recognition' can scarcely be an obstacle to a peace settlement."

In taking this tack, Dadyants was following PRAVDA's former Middle East expert Belyayev, who had noted in an INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS article in October 1968 that Resolution 242 recognized the right of every state in the Middle East to independent and sovereign existence, and had gone on to remark: "What is this, de facto recognition of Israel? Egypt, indeed, practically did recognize Israel as far back as 1949 by signing an armistice agreement with her." And in July 1970 Belyayev wrote in PRAVDA that Cairo had many times called for implementation of Resolution 242, and "surely this testifies that Egypt is ready to recognize the right of all states and peoples of the Near East to independence and free existence."

The same line of argument was amplified in a June 1971 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS article by Dmitriyev and Ladeikin; who also maintained that by agreeing with Resolution 242 Egypt had expressed its willingness to recognize Israel. The authors declared that Egypt and other states had showed this willingness even earlier, and launched into a description of the Lausanne Protocol of 12 May 1949 according to which, they said, the Arab states recognized the 29 November 1947 UNGA resolution on the partition of Palestine and "thereby expressed a willingness to recognize Israel's right to existence but, of course, only if it adhered to the UN resolutions."

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## U. S. - ROMANIA

## CEAUSESCU VISIT SAID TO BOOST BUCHAREST'S INDEPENDENCE

The U.S. endorsement of Romania's position of independence in the joint declaration signed by Ceausescu and President Nixon on 5 December was treated as an event of "historic significance" by the party daily SCINTEIA at the close of Ceausescu's 4-8 December visit. A SCINTEIA article on the 9th was ecstatic on the theme of independence, asserting that the joint declaration "sanctifies those fundamental principles of international legality and ethics" which permit "full assertion of the personality of each nation, of its sacred right to be master of its destinies." It underscored the "historic significance" of the agreement with Washington on principles of international relations that Bucharest has defended over the years with "perseverance and tenacity."

In his public utterances during the visit, Ceausescu was evenhanded in praising the improvement in U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and with China. He characteristically refrained from paying any special tribute to Brezhnev's contributions to detente. Thus, at the White House dinner on the 4th he merely noted the "contacts" established by the President's visit to Peking and the "agreements" reached during the exchange of visits between the President and Brezhnev, concluding that "undoubtedly all this has played and is playing an important role in international life." In his appearance at the National Press Club on the 5th, Ceausescu reiterated the standard Bucharest line that Romania, "together with the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty," favors simultaneous abolition of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. AGERPRES reported these remarks without acknowledging that Ceausescu had been asked if Romania intended to withdraw from the alliance.

Soviet media coverage of the visit was typically spotty and uninformative, giving no indication of the contents of the various accords signed in Washington. For example, a TASS item on the 6th noted merely that the joint declaration said the two leaders had "discussed American-Romanian relations and also the main international problems." Peking's single report on the visit, an 8 December NCNA recap of its highlights, went into somewhat greater detail than Moscow on the content of the joint declaration and the bilateral economic agreements.

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## COMMUNIST RELATIONS

## KADAR, ZHIVKOV CALL FOR NEW WORLD PARTY CONFERENCE

The top Hungarian and Bulgarian party leaders have become the first in East Europe to call for a new international conference of communist parties. The calls, delivered at a 6 December Budapest rally for Zhivkov, were similar to those initiated by the West German Communist Party (DKP) at its November congress and duly reported by the Soviet and East German party newspapers on 3 November.\* PRAVDA on 7 December similarly reported the new East European appeals for a conference.

Kadar, in his welcoming speech at the rally for Zhivkov, declared that "the necessity is ripening for representatives of communist and workers parties to meet again." Zhivkov, in his speech as broadcast live by the Budapest radio, likewise said that "our party and several other parties" believe the need "to collectively analyze" new issues "is becoming ever more urgent." That Zhivkov took his cue from Kadar is evident from the fact that his remarks on a party conclave were not included in the advance text of Zhivkov's speech as transmitted by the Budapest MTI radioteletype service in Hungarian.

Both Kadar and Zhivkov prefaced their calls for a new conference with attacks on Peking and references to the last international party conference in Moscow in 1969, a conference which both the Hungarian and Bulgarian parties had actively promoted. The two leaders' juxtaposition of harsh attacks on "the Maoists" with references to the 1969 conference and appeals for a new conclave suggest that one of the purposes of a new conference, like the 1969 one, would be to deal with Peking's alleged disruption of the communist movement.

The 7 December joint communique on Zhivkov's visit to Budapest, while attacking the Chinese, did not include specific calls for a new international party conference but merely stressed the importance of "consultations between the fraternal parties" to strengthen unity. Communiques on earlier Zhivkov visits--to Prague in October and Warsaw in November--reaffirmed the importance of unity but did not refer explicitly to "fraternal consultations."

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\* For background, see the TRENDS of 7 November 1973, pages 19-20.

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The Italian Communist Party's continued reservations regarding any conference convened for the purpose of consolidating a common front against the Chinese were reflected in the communique issued at the end of General Secretary Berlinguer's 3-7 December visit to the GDR. According to the text carried by ADN, the Italian CP leader and Honecker agreed on "the usefulness of meetings" between communist and workers parties, provided that each party's "independence and equal rights" are taken into account.

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## INDOCHINA

## NHAN DAN COMMENTATOR REJECTS KISSINGER'S "CIVIL WAR" LABEL

Secretary Kissinger's remarks on Vietnam in his 6 December press conference prompted the first NHAN DAN Commentator article since last April when this vehicle was used to blast the joint communique on President Thieu's U.S. visit and the Nixon Doctrine.\* While this is only the second Commentator article since the January peace agreement, during the war such articles were the traditional format for authoritative Hanoi comment on Presidential and other high-level Administration statements on Indochina.

In the article, published in NHAN DAN on 8 December, Commentator took strong exception to Secretary Kissinger's description of the South Vietnamese situation as a "civil war" and his statement that the responsibility for maintaining peace now rests with the Vietnamese. Commentator said flatly that the war in Vietnam, "for decades now, has never been a civil war." He reiterated long-standing charges that the United States is providing military aid and military advisors to the Saigon government and that the GVN owes its existence to such U.S. sponsorship. He also cited the presence of U.S. troops in Thailand and Taiwan, its air bases in Thailand, and the 7th Fleet in the China Sea as evidence of continued U.S. involvement in Indochina.

Commentator construed a hypothetical discussion at the press conference of the need for congressional approval for the United States to reintervene in Indochina as a "threat" and as "encouraging the Thieu clique to prolong the conflict and sabotage the Paris agreement." He added that such threats "expose the true U.S. schemes" and that: "It is not North Vietnamese infiltration--as Kissinger tried to put it--but systematic and deliberate U.S. actions which are causing a tense situation in Vietnam and Indochina." Commentator completely ignored the Secretary's statement that a move to reintroduce U.S. forces is not an imminent possibility, and he claimed elsewhere that the United States has been making "blatant threats of a bombing resumption against North Vietnam."

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\* For a discussion of Commentator's last previous article, see the TRENDS of 11 April 1973, pages 6-7.

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Since mid-October, when the communists issued the 15 October PLAF communique on counterattacks and adopted a more threatening posture toward Saigon, Hanoi and the PRG have released a series of unusually high-level official statements calling attention to long-standing charges of illegal U.S. involvement in the conflict in South Vietnam. This issue was the subject of DRV and PRG foreign ministry statements in mid-October, on 3 November, and again on 29 and 30 November. It was also raised in PRG and DRV government statements on 9 and 10 November pegged to Saigon air attacks. That Hanoi should revive Commentator at this time to respond as he did to what were essentially tangential and conciliatory comments on Vietnam by Secretary Kissinger suggests a continuing Hanoi preoccupation with attempting to implicate the United States in the heightened military action now taking place in the South and involve it in the problem of ending the hostilities.

#### COMMUNISTS REPORT PLAF ATTACKS ON NHA BE, KIEN DUC

Overcoming their initial reticence, Vietnamese communists have now taken credit for the destruction of the Nha Be fuel depot near Saigon on 3 December and acknowledged their attack on the Quang Duc district town of Kien Duc on 4 December.\*

Although communist media were quick to transmit Western reports of the burning of the Nha Be fuel depot, their first explicit admission that the attack was indeed carried out by the PLAF did not come until the broadcast of a terse Liberation Radio announcement on the 5th. It was obvious thereafter that any hesitancy that might have been felt at first about coming up to the attack had been dispelled: A Liberation Radio commentary broadcast a few hours later called the action an "appropriate and punitive blow" by the PLAF and urged that "there must be more severe and painful blows, such as the Nha Be attack" to serve as warning to Thieu for his "crimes." When communist media were first reporting the attack on the basis of pickup from Western news agencies, they indicated it was an artillery shelling that caused the fire. Later reports and commentary of their own, however, only stated that there was an attack in which the depot was set ablaze and avoided mentioning any kind of

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\* The attacks on the Nha Be fuel depot and Kien Duc are discussed in the 5 December 1973 TRENDS, pages 13-14.

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shelling. This was in contrast to communist reports of the PLAF's 6 November attack on Bien Hoa airbase, which consistently noted the use of artillery.

Communist media also showed hesitancy in their initial treatment of the 4 December attack on Kien Duc. The first communist mention of the attack was an oblique remark in a 5 December PRG Foreign Ministry statement charging the United States and Saigon with escalation of the war. According to the statement, Saigon had "made a fuss about the so-called attack on Kien Duc district town" as a pretext for threatening future air raids against PRG-held territory. By the 6th, however, communist media were openly taking credit for the action, with a Liberation Radio broadcast claiming that the Eastern Nam Bo PLAF had attacked the town to "annihilate" Saigon troops for their violations of the Paris agreement. Subsequent communist reportage and commentary have continued to refer to the attack as "punitive" and, despite Saigon assertions that the town has been retaken, as of the 9th the communists claimed it was still under PLAF control.

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## SIHANOUK BELATEDLY ENDORSES DRY SEASON OFFENSIVE, RGNU SHIFT

In a recent series of statements prompted by the UN General Assembly debate on Cambodian representation, Prince Sihanouk has belatedly offered his first official endorsement of the announced insurgent plans for a dry season offensive and the transfer of several of his government's ministries, previously stationed abroad, to the Cambodian liberated zone. Sihanouk was particularly insistent upon correcting the image of the RGNU as a government in exile and upon scotching Western press reports of division and dissension within the Front.

The unsuccessful RGNU effort to unseat Lon Nol from the Cambodian UN seat--halted by a U.S.-supported resolution that narrowly passed on 5 December and deferred consideration of the issue until next year--prompted Chinese comment offering generalized support for Front policies and criticism of the United States. Hanoi backing for Sihanouk was offered in comment on the UN decision and on an international solidarity conference on Cambodia held in Paris on 8-9 December that was attended by lower-level RGNU and Vietnamese communist officials.

## SIHANOUK STATEMENTS

A 22 November Sihanouk statement on the UN General Assembly debate contained his first official acknowledgement of Front statements in late October calling for an offensive and the 9 November announcement of the RGNU ministries shift.\* Carried textually by NCNA, the statement fully endorsed the military drive, echoing earlier Front pronouncements in noting that the Cambodian struggle has reached "its decisive nonreversible last phase" and is "approaching now its victorious end." Sihanouk underlined his position in a 3 December message, carried by AKI on the 6th, that congratulated the chief Front leader in the interior, Khieu Samphan, on the insurgents' recent battle successes and noted that the Front is in a position "to liberate Phnom Penh in the not too distant future."

The transfer of the RGNU ministries from Sihanouk's base in China to the Cambodian "liberated zone" was hailed in the 22 November statement and in two Sihanouk statements on the eve of the

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\* The Cambodian insurgents' plans for a new offensive are discussed in the TRENDS of 7 November 1973, pages 16-18; the shift of RGNU ministries from Peking to the "liberated zone" in the TRENDS of 14 November, pages 17-20.

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4-5 December UN debate which announced the nomination of five new ministers. Though Sihanouk said he had ratified the nominees, he carefully pointed out the important role played by Khieu Samphan and his Khmer Rouge colleagues in the selection process. In an obvious effort to counter recent Western press reports--some of which have been attributed to Sihanouk--of a growing cleavage in the Front as a result of the shift of ministries, the prince formally thanked the interior chiefs for having helped him "to achieve the homogeneity of our RGNU as a government entirely based inside our country" and to thus "greatly strengthen our position in the international arena."

In an earlier apparent effort to demonstrate Front unanimity, AKI on 26 November had replayed a 10-day-old Sihanouk statement to the Western press in which he frankly acknowledged initial differences over the transfer but rejected Phnom Penh allegations that the ministries' shift demonstrated that the prince had been eclipsed by the Khmer Rouge leaders. AKI quoted Sihanouk as claiming that he himself had initiated the move and that he had been constrained to resign his position as chief of state in order to seek approval by the leaders within Cambodia, who "were slow in accepting my proposal." The statement added that the interior leaders had subsequently agreed to the transfer and had sent an official message expressing "their complete confidence" in the prince and petitioning that he not resign. Neither the Sihanouk message of resignation nor the interior leaders' statement of support has been otherwise publicized by Front media.

FOREIGN SUPPORT  
FOR SIHANOUK

Consistent with Peking's unflagging support for Sihanouk's government in the United Nations, Chinese representative Huang Hua offered a lengthy tribute to the RGNU in his speech at the start of General Assembly deliberations on the 4th, while castigating the "Lon Nol clique" as belonging on "the garbage heap of history." In addition to routinely pledging Chinese backing for Sihanouk as "head of state" and for the RCU as "the sole lawful government of Cambodia," Huang voiced Peking's only formal support to date for the dry season offensive and the RGNU ministries' transfer. He offered full support for Sihanouk's uncompromising stance in his 22 November statement, and favorably noted that since the season offensive started in November the insurgents have won "important victories of strategic significance." Even though Peking has been constrained to muffle its criticism of Soviet Cambodian policy since Moscow recognized the RGNU, Huang managed to single out the hypocrisy of an unnamed "superpower" which had professed

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support for the Cambodian struggle but had continued relations with Lon Nol and had refused to recognize the RGNU "during the Cambodian people's most difficult time of their struggle."

Huang was carefully restrained in his criticism of the United States, but a 7 December PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, responding to the General Assembly's passage of the resolution to defer the Cambodian issue until next year, was sharply critical of remarks by the U.S. representative, Tapley Bennett, in the 5 December general debate. While the article duly criticized the deferment motion as "trickery" by "U.S. imperialism," it focused on Bennett's charge that support for the RGNU position represented support for "great power hegemony in Asia." Rebutting this "grave accusation," Commentator significantly admonished Bennett, but not the U.S. Government, that "if you are really open and above-board and are not seeking hegemony in Asia, then you should not obstruct the restoration of the lawful rights of the RGNU in the UN."

Hanoi duly condemned the United States over the deferment in a NHAN DAN commentary on the 7th, but offered more authoritative support for Sihanouk's Front in a Pham Van Dong message on the 7th and an 8 December NHAN DAN editorial hailing the Paris solidarity conference on Cambodia. Dong praised Sihanouk as "head of state," denounced the "Lon Nol clique," and pledged Vietnamese support until final victory. The editorial focused on the U.S. role in Cambodia and throughout Indochina, charging that Washington is pursuing the "Nixon doctrine" in order to "harness the Cambodians to the U.S. neocolonialist yoke."

The Paris meeting was noted in TASS news reports and prompted a brief PRAVDA commentary supporting the Front. Moscow did not criticize the motion to defer the Cambodian question in the UN, but did offer its support to Sihanouk prior to the debate. Most notably, a lengthy 23 November IZVESTIYA commentary portrayed Moscow as a consistent supporter of the Front, cited Soviet support for the RGNU in the UN, and specifically pointed to the FUNK and RGNU as "the only genuine representatives of the freedom-loving people of Cambodia."

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PRG DELEGATION LED BY NGUYEN HUU THO CONCLUDES WARSAW VISIT

Communist media reports on the 3-5 December "official visit" to Poland by a high-level PRG delegation, led by Advisory Council Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, reflected standard expressions of solidarity and friendship and noted an agreement was signed on economic aid for the PRG in 1974. President Jablonski hosted the delegation in the usual round of talks, banquets, and rally speeches, and First Secretary Gierek received Tho, Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh, and other delegation members. The PRG group went on from Warsaw to begin a visit to Hungary and, according to an official announcement on the 10th, it will visit the USSR during the last half of December.

In the joint communique on Tho's Poland visit both sides condemned the Saigon administration for violating the Paris accord with the backing of "imperialist forces hostile to peace." While Warsaw thus stopped short of condemning the United States by name, it went further than it had in July in a joint communique on DRV Premier Pham Van Dong's visit, when the issue of violations was not even mentioned. Also, for the first time in such a communique, Poland referred to the PRG as "the only true representative of the South Vietnamese people." Warsaw's account of the July communique with Dong had used the formulation "the only true spokesman for the aspirations" of the South Vietnamese.

PAP on 4 December reported that foreign ministers Olszowski and Binh advocated in their talks that the PRG be admitted to international organizations and granted "permanent observer status" in the United Nations; however, this point was not made in the communique or pressed by Vietnamese communist media. Following the Paris international conference on Vietnam in February and March, Vietnamese communist media had claimed that UN Secretary General Waldheim had raised the idea of UN observer status with Binh during a meeting in Paris and had discussed the possibility of establishing a PRG liaison office at the UN.

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## USSR

### INDUSTRIAL REORGANIZATION MARKED BY DELAYS AND DISPUTES

Many Soviet ministries have failed to meet the six-month deadline, decreed by the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers last March, for ministerial proposals on the establishment of new industrial and production associations. The 2 March decree had called for creating two types of associations to replace the intermediate level of main administrations or glavki currently operating between ministries and enterprises: production associations, which would be directly subordinated to ministries, and all-union or republic industrial associations, which would replace the glavki and manage the production associations of the enterprises directly. The delay apparently stems not only from ministerial resistance but also from jurisdictional disputes between central and local interests. All-union industrial associations based in Moscow are favored by central planners and administrators as a means of preserving or even strengthening their power.

**MINISTERIAL DELAYS** A 15 August PRAVDA editorial criticized some ministries for delaying creation of the associations and even dismantling certain successful associations under the pretext of promoting specialization. A 12 September PRAVDA article noted the delay in implementing the March decree and inquired "why many ministries are not rushing to create associations and why enterprises themselves, including even small and backward ones, are not striving to join together." The article attributed the delay to bureaucratic fears of losing jobs or authority.

Indicating that some ministry officials have been resorting to subterfuges in complying with the decree, the 12 September PRAVDA article warned against the practice of renaming glavki "production associations" without changing their operational functions. The economist L. A. Leontyev complained in the October issue of OKTYABR about the formation of a large number of "mini-associations" or "quasi-associations" in which the administration of enterprises was centralized in name only. A 12 September editorial in the Ukrainian paper RABOCHAYA GAZETA also complained that some ministries were creating "dwarf" associations or were taking other "half measures" which amounted to little change in their operations.

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Displaying distrust of the ministries, the editorial called for "active intervention" by oblast and city party organizations and party committees of ministries to verify implementation of the decree. This call has not received followup publicity.

**DISAGREEMENTS** Implementation of the decree is also being impeded by disagreements over the two types of associations that it recommended. For example, the 4 October SOCIALIST INDUSTRY described such a dispute within the USSR Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy, where ministry leaders, especially at the glavki level, favored all-union industrial branch associations based on the glavki--a variant requiring only minimal changes in the ministry's structure--in preference to territorial-type associations. The 12 September L'RAVDA article had warned that creation of all-union industrial associations "should in no way be accompanied by 'closing' of cost accounting production associations."

The issues of central versus local control, and even the value of cost accounting, have also cropped up in discussion of the reorganization. In a September ZHURNALIST interview on associations, K. N. Rudnev, whose Ministry of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment and Control Systems was the first to convert to the new system of all-union industrial associations based on cost accounting, criticized some plant managers and journalists for exaggerating the expansion of cost accounting and the independence of enterprises while ignoring the need to strengthen central planning and treating the latter as some sort of relic of the past. On the other hand, the Leontyev article had alluded to the existence of doubts about the compatibility of cost accounting and central planning and called it "naive to assume that the weaker cost accounting is, the higher will be the leading role of centralized planning, or that strengthening cost accounting means weakening centrally planned administration of the economy."

Localities and even republics appear threatened with the loss of some of their enterprises and administrative agencies under the provisions of the decree stipulating that administrative boundaries should not stand in the way of the reorganization. But some republics, like the Ukraine, appear to be resisting. A speech by Gosplan official N. Drogichinskiy, reported in the August QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS, recalled that in converting the chemical industry ministry to a three-tier system consisting of the ministry, the all-union association, and the enterprises, the ministry had been changed from union republic to all-union

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status and all republic agencies had been abolished. The coal industry had also been reduced to the three-tier system, he noted, except that the Ukraine still retained its own coal ministry. This is hardly surprising in view of the vigorous defense of the Ukrainian coal industry by former republic First Secretary Shelest at the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971 and by Ukrainian Premier Lyashko and industry party secretary Titarenko at the December 1972 USSR Supreme Soviet sessions.\*

#### SUSLOV ACCORDED PERSONAL ACCOLADES IN LITHUANIA

During CPSU Politburo member Suslov's 28 November visit to Lithuania to present the republic an award, he was accorded the kind of personal tribute usually reserved for Brezhnev. Although Suslov recently has shared other such distinctions with Brezhnev, notably publication of his collected works, he clearly was honored on this occasion because of his close ties with the Lithuanians since World War II.

Central press reports on the visit deleted personal tributes to Suslov such as those in the 29 November SOVETSKAYA LITVA, which reported praise of Suslov for his past work in Lithuania and his continuing involvement in Lithuanian affairs. Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman M. Shumauskas introduced Suslov at the award ceremony as our "dear and respected guest whom we know very well in our republic." First Secretary Smechkus devoted four paragraphs of his speech to Suslov, describing how he had served as head of the Central Committee Bureau for Lithuania at the end of the war, "sharing with us the burdens of those days" and inspiring Lithuanian workers with "courage and confidence." Lithuanian Academy of Sciences President Yu. Matulis declared that the CPSU Central Committee and "our highly respected and dear guest" have given great assistance to Lithuanian science. On behalf of Lithuanian scientists he expressed "the deepest thanks" to "dear Mikhail Andreyevich." Smechkus also expressed delight that Suslov could attend the awards ceremony; Suslov in turn expressed thanks for the opportunity, as one who "once worked in Lithuania."

\* See the TRENDS of 4 January 1973, pages 40-41.

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## REGIME MOVES TO PLACE LIMITS ON KOLKHOZ WAGES

Complaints that some kolkhozes have been allotting too much of their income to wages, to the detriment of investment, have prompted the USSR Ministry of Agriculture and the Institute for the Economics of Agriculture to prepare instructions regulating the allocation of kolkhoz income. This was revealed in the November ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE, which reported on a 7-8 August conference on distribution of kolkhoz income called to discuss the draft instructions.

An agriculture ministry spokesman at the conference complained that while the average kolkhoz allotted 70 percent or more of its net income to investment, 40 percent of the farms allotted less than half their income and over 3,000 kolkhozes were allocating only 10-20 percent. Speakers also indicated that kolkhoz wage increases often outstrip the growth of farm productivity and income because of excessive bonuses and supplemental pay and advocated limits on the latter. While approving the draft instructions "in the main," the conference decided against specifying any rigid norms for kolkhoz investment and consumption in the new instructions and recommended that the draft take fuller account of the differences between kolkhozes in various regions.

The new instructions appear to be part of a recent tightening up on longtime abuses associated with kolkhoz affluence. An 11 May USSR Council of Ministers decree placing limits on kolkhoz subsidiary enterprises complained that the high wages paid by subsidiaries have been drawing labor away from agricultural work and even from industry. The decree restricted the wages to the pay scales used by sovkhozes and local industry. A 19 June Council of Ministers decree complained that virgin land farms were "disrupting labor discipline" by paying excessive wages and illegal bonuses to lure kolkhozniks to seasonal work in Siberia and Kazakhstan, and it restricted the wages to the pay scales for analogous work in sovkhozes and construction projects.

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NOTE

PRC DELEGATION IN LAOS: A Chinese delegation feted in Sam Neua from 27 November to 5 December was the highest-level PRC delegation ever known to have visited the territory controlled by the Lao Patriotic Front. Extensive Pathet Lao reporting on the delegation's activities did not reveal the official occasion for the visit, but a possible clue was the participation of Sisavat Keobounphan, the seldom-identified chief of staff of the Lao People's Liberation Army, as the main Lao representative in the talks with the Chinese. There were two CCP Central Committee members in the Chinese group, including the delegation head Chen Kang, secretary of the CCP provincial committee for the PRC's neighboring Yunnan Province. The delegation was received by Chairman Souphanouvong and attended a banquet, rally, and farewell party hosted by other LPF leaders. The Chinese visit followed closely on the heels of the first visit to Sam Neua of a high-level North Vietnamese delegation, headed by VWP First Secretary Le Duan, in early November.

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## SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

### NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY COMMENTATORS

In the past month, U.S. strategy and the balance of forces in the wake of the peace agreement have been discussed at length by two of Hanoi's authoritative military commentators. The series of articles were published in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN under the pen names of "Chien Binh" (Combatant) and "Chien Thang" (Victor). Chien Thang focused mainly on the situation in Vietnam, claiming, as he did in articles last August, that the revolutionary forces throughout Vietnam are now stronger than their foes, although he did acknowledge problems in North Vietnam's armed forces. Chien Binh offered a lengthy discourse on the Nixon Doctrine, centering attention on the pitfalls of detente and what he described as President Nixon's "strategic objective" of dividing the communist countries, particularly the Soviet Union and China.

All of the articles, with the exception of the eighth, and presumably final, installment of the Chien Binh series, have been broadcast by Hanoi radio. The first Chien Binh article appeared in the army paper on 22 October and subsequent installments were published and broadcast at irregular intervals until the eighth article was published on 24 November. By contrast, the 10 Chien Thang articles were carried almost daily by the press and radio beginning on 26 November and continuing through 7 December.

### "CHIEN THANG" REVIEWS MILITARY SITUATION, BALANCE OF FORCES

The current Chien Thang series stressing the need for military as well as political and diplomatic efforts to prevent the "sabotage" of the peace agreement comes against the background of his articles last August which presented an unusually blunt argument for military action.\* His argument in August seemed to have provided the theoretical justification for the 15 October PLAF communique calling for "counterattacks" and the limited communist offensive actions. In his latest series,

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\* Chien Thang's August articles are discussed in the TRENDS of 29 August 1973, pages 7-9.

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Chien Thang again underlined the importance of an offensive posture and urged that in all situations "appropriate offensive forms and measures" be taken to "further exacerbate the enemy's weaknesses." According to Chien Thang: "Realities emerging from the struggle in South Vietnam prove that we must use revolutionary force and the masses' revolutionary action to counter the enemy's counterrevolutionary forces."

**DRV ARMY** Chieng Thang generally stressed the need for strong military forces and his last three articles--broadcast on 4, 6, and 7 December--appeared to reflect apprehension over the state of military discipline in the North and the absence of enthusiasm for the war effort in the South. His August articles had set the stage for this discussion by stressing the North's role in the balance of forces in the entire country. The problems of army discipline and morale have cropped up periodically since the peace agreement, with one of the most extensive indictments offered in a 1 October QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article by Quang Minh. Minh called for efforts to insure absolute submission to party leadership, implementation of party and state laws and army regulations, and obedience of orders. He suggested that some of Hanoi's problems stem from the increased discipline necessary for a modern army--noting, for example, that the lack of uniformity in regulations is acceptable in a guerrilla army but is inconsistent with the functioning of a regular, modern army.

In suggesting some dissatisfaction with the state of readiness of the northern forces, Chien Thang seemed to be alluding to their ultimate assignments in the South. He reminded the military that they "must always look toward the frontline, be ready to confront the enemy, and volunteer to accept responsibility in the revolutionary vanguard." While indicating that the army has in the past "satisfactorily" fulfilled the tasks assigned to it by the party, he asserted that the tasks of the "new period" call for improved disciplinary training, correction of shortcomings, and overcoming "all manifestations of liberalism." In what could be a swipe at the role of the army in economic reconstruction, Chien Thang observed that the armed forces must be "unswervingly aware that their principal function is to fight."

**BALANCE OF FORCES** Chien Thang argued that the departure of U.S. forces had created a "turning point" for the balance of forces and set off a trend that promised to be "increasingly favorable to the revolution." As last

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August, he evaluated the balance in positive terms, maintaining that the "revolutionary forces throughout the country" are stronger than those of Saigon "in all aspects," and that the "revolutionary struggle now enjoys more advantages than in any previous period."

While Chien Thang's August articles dealt primarily with the situation in Vietnam, his current series underlined the effect of the world situation on Vietnam: "The changes in the balance of forces between the revolution and counter-revolution in Vietnam have been inseparable from the general situation in Indochina and the general situation of the world revolutionary struggle." He also offered the view that the Paris agreement reflects the balance of forces between the revolution and counterrevolution in the Vietnam war theater and "elsewhere in the world."

Such linking of the Paris agreement to the balance of forces has only occasionally been made in Hanoi comment. Most notably, Hoang Tung, chief editor of the party paper NHAN DAN had commented in an article last April that the agreement was not a complete victory, but only "the greatest victory we could win considering the actual balance of forces between us and the enemy." Tung did not specify whether he was referring only to the balance of forces in Vietnam or also considering the international situation, but he pointedly observed elsewhere in the article that the failure of the earlier wars in Korea and Vietnam to unify those countries was due to the stalemate between the international "revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces."<sup>\*</sup>

#### "CHIEN BINH" SCORES U.S. DETENTE WITH PEKING, MOSCOW

The series of articles by Chien Bin provided the most extensive North Vietnamese denunciation in more than a year of Peking and Moscow's expanded ties with the United States. In the past, major North Vietnamese discourses on this issue have generally coincided with apparent exacerbation of differences between Hanoi and its allies--for example in August 1972 when Hanoi

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\* Hoang Tung's article appeared in the April issue of the party theoretical journal HCC TAP and is discussed in the TRENDS of 9 May 1973, pages 5-6.

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comment suggested that it was being pressured by them to make unacceptable compromises to reach a peace settlement.

Whatever the state of current communist relations, the release of the articles may have been timed to coincide with Secretary Kissinger's visit to Peking which had originally been scheduled to begin on 26 October--four days after the first article was published. The series continued throughout November, including comment on U.S.-Soviet efforts to defuse the Middle East situation, and the final article appeared on 24 November--10 days after the Kissinger visit to Peking was concluded.\*

Chien Binh described the United States as being in a "drastically weakened and stalemated position"--the "defeat" in Vietnam, economic difficulties, the "credibility crisis," and Watergate--and because of this is attempting to split the socialist camp. One of the main strategems that Chien Binh accused the United States of using to achieve this design was the propagation of the "multipolar line," which holds that world events result from relations between five poles--the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and Western Europe--and that these events are no longer affected by the struggle between two opposing social or ideological systems. In a later article Chien Binh also castigated the United States for attempting to make inroads into the communist world with economic weapons. He observed that the United States gives some nations preferential treatment--while others--Cuba, Vietnam, and the DPRK--are subjected to economic restrictions.

The pique the author feels about Soviet cooperation with the United States, although couched in terms critical of the U.S. role, was amply evident in his references to the Middle East crisis. Characterizing Secretary Kissinger's visit to the Arab capitals as a "perfidious scheme," he bemoaned the fact that the United States was allegedly attempting to limit socialist influence in the Middle East.

Hanoi's dissatisfaction with the policies of its allies was particularly apparent in Chien Binh's final article, which warned that the United States is attempting through its policy of "'detente' with the big countries" to "control

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\* The Chien Binh series is also discussed in the TRENDS of 25 October 1973, pages 17-18, and 31 October 1973, page 24.

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the socialist countries in their movement to develop the revolutionary offensive." Setting forth Hanoi's case to its allies, he contended that: "In the revolutionary struggle, detente can only be used to create conditions to launch stronger offensives." He also accused President Nixon of attempting to divide the world into spheres of influence and claimed that the President particularly feared the strength that would result from communist unity and therefore concentrates on dividing the communist camp--"first of all separating the USSR from China."

"HUONG XUAN"  
ARTICLES      Coincidentally with the publication of this final Chien Binh article, the North Vietnamese party paper NHAN DAN on 23 and 24 November focused on the question of detente in an article published in two installments under the pen name "Huong Xuan." Like Chien Binh, Huong Xuan stressed that U.S. "talk of conciliation" is prompted by the weakening of the U.S. strategic posture. In this respect, he recalled Le Duan's remark at the 11 July Moscow ceremony awarding the Lenin prize to Brezhnev: "The increasingly developing strength of the world's revolutionary and peace forces are firm guarantees of a lasting peace and are conducive to the present conciliatory trend in the world." More specifically, the author added: "The victories of the Indochinese peoples are the basic cause that forced the Nixon Administration to adopt a three-way diplomatic policy and run here and there to try to achieve conciliation."

Huong Xuan warned "it would be erroneous" to believe that "the Nixon-Kissinger clique" had changed its nature and was sincerely pursuing East-West detente and respecting agreements concluded with its adversaries. In documenting his suspicions about U.S. intentions, the author cited statements by Defense Secretary Schlesinger and General Abrams cautioning about detente and remarked that "Nixon and Kissinger have wisely concealed their real intentions, whereas their aides have talked bluntly." Citing U.S. actions throughout the world to substantiate his charge of U.S. duplicity, Huong Xuan concluded with the accusation that the Administration has "applied the strategy of reconciling with this or that socialist state to deeply aggravate the contradictions among socialist countries and to create a feud."

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## APPENDIX

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 3 - 9 DECEMBER 1973

<u>Moscow (2664 items)</u>		<u>Peking (1114 items)</u>	
Brezhnev in India	(39%)	16%	Domestic Issues (40%) 47%
[Soviet Party- Government Statement]	(--)	4%]	Cambodia (1%) 16%
Middle East	(7%)	5%	[UN Membership (--) 11%]
Soviet Constitution Day	(--)	4%	Debate
China	(2%)	4%	Nepal King in PRC (--) 8%
			Middle East (14%) 4%
			Vietnam (4%) 4%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.